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A SOCIAL SCIENTIST LOOKS AT UNITARIANS AND SEPARATISTS 
by 
William G. Andrews 
As I understand the purpose of this symposium, it brings together a 
"''theorist" on social science methodology, a commentator from another theore­
tical perspective, and a "practitioner" as a second commentator. Professor 
Rudner has selected as the object of his theoretical attention the problem of 
subjectivism in the social sciences and titles his paper, "Some Essays at 
Objectivity". He focuses his remarks on criticism of a little book by Peter Winch, 
The Idea of a Social Science. He challenges what he calls Professor Winch's 
"separatist" position from what, in the interests of terminological symmetry, I 
shall call a "unitarian" position. My response, I understand, should reflect my 
judgment as a "practitioner" on the practical value of his paper and his position. 
While he bolsters my theoretical apparatus-as he has surely done-I shall at­
tempt to put his abstractions to concrete test. I shall do so by weighing the 
relative merits of the two positions in the Rudner-Winch debate. 
This delineation of my assignment excludes both a systematic logical analysis 
of Professor Rudner's paper and the exposition of an alternative approach. Nor 
will I attempt to consider whether Professor Rudner's critique of the Winch book 
is fair or accurate or complete. Still less will I critique Winch or, for that matter 
even read him. So far as these tasks are to be tackled in this symposium, I leave 
them to my political theory coll�gue, Professor Kateb. Professor Rudner has 
defined the struggle between the "unitarians" and the "separatists". I shall 
stand apart from the contentions themselves and try to appraise the relative 
utility for the social sciences of the two basic stances. How useful is Professor 
Rudner's philosophical analysis to social scientists? How useful, by way of com­
parison, is Professor Winch's approach? Do either or both of them deal with 
methodological problems important in today's social science? These are the 
principal questions which are directed to me. County Agent Rudner has come 
out to Social Science Farms to explain some principles of insect eradication. The 
Old Dirt Farmer is asked to react. Before I can, however, we need to consider 
briefly the issue joined by Professors Rudner and Winch as defined by the 
former. 
The Rudner Argument. Because a revised version of the Rudner paper is in­
cluded in this volume I shall present here only enough substance from the 
original version to enable the reader to understand what I think I am agreeing 
with. As I read his paper, his main point is that Professor Winch and other 
"methodological separatists" err in their "denial of the unity of scientific 
method," especially in their belief that the study of society requires a different 
"logic of validation" than is required for the study of nature. Professor Rudner 
reflects the view that social science investigation, unlike the natural sciences, 
requires "the adoption by the social scientist of the teleology of the observed." 
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Similarly, he finds unconvincing the Winch argument that the scientific inves­
tigator cannot "translate" words (and, by extension, other so<:ial phenomena) in 
any meaningful way. He exhorts us social scientists to push ahead with the 
Spring plowing and pay no heed to Professor Winch's "flying lox box." That 
fierce-looking insect, he tells us, is quite harmless. Though we may gaze raptly at 
the exotic coloration and form and be irritated by its buzzing about our 
scientifically cultivated crop of social science concepts, we need take no preven­
tive measures. No spraying is required, for any apparent dangers from the flying 
lox box are purely illusory. In fact, he insists, the flying lox box itself is an 
illusion, the product of the overactive and misdirected imagination of a sincere 
but wrongheaded itinerant quack insecticide peddler. 
In order for the simple dirt farmer, like myself, to evaluate the Rudner argu­
ment, I must be sure I understand some of his key terms. Apparently, Professor 
Rudne_r's peers down at the Agricultural Experiment Station know what he 
means by "the scientific method" and "unity," for I find no definition of those 
terms in his paper. A poor dirt farmer social scientist, however, does not spin in 
so closed a terminological circle and needs the help of such definitions. 
By picking clues here and there, I believe I can fabricate definitions that will 
do justice to Rudner's case. He seems to equate "the logic of validation, of ex­
planation and prediction" with "the scientific method" and he provides·examples 
of "paraphernalia of scientific validation (including, e.g., the ernpirical testing 
of theories containing lawlike sentences-sentences testable through their uses in 
explanation and prediction)." Also he infers from Winch's writing that "he 
appears to concede" that "physical science investigations" consist of "the 
logical subsumption of statements describing them under general scientific 
laws-through the confirmation of theories containing such laws and employed 
to make successful predictions." The framing of a "meaningful empirical hypo­
thesis" is an essential part of the scientific method. So are "verificational can­
ons." These are all the remarks I can find in his paper that shed light directly on 
his definition of "the scientific method." Any others are so subtle as to escape 
the eye of at least one dirt farmer. 
To form the definition needed, then, we must assemble the gist of those 
remarks in the context of the dirt farmer's general, commonsense notions of the 
meaning of the term. This may produce a much cruder definition than Professor 
Rudner would have provided, but it is the most one can expect of the poor dirt 
farmer and it ought to be adequate for our purpose. Using that approach, I 
arrive at the understanding that he means "the scientific method" to be a 
systematic process of intellectual inquiry that includes these steps: 
1. The identification ,of a problem susceptible of such inquiry. 
2. The acquisition of enough information about the problem to formulate 
one or more hypotheses that are designed to solve the problem and are 
testable. 
3. The formulation of the hypothesis or hypotheses. 
4. The testing of the hypothesis or hypotheses by application to examples of 
the problem and determination of whether one of them has the predictive 
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capacity necessary for solution. 
5. The revision of the hypotheses in the light of that testing in such ways as 
logic indicates to improve the predictive capacity. 
6. Repetition of the process until a hypothesis provides sufficient predicta­
bility to qualify as a "scientific law." 
7. The application of this process to related problems until enough related 
laws are produced to form a "theory." 
8. The validation of the "theory" by the same process applied more broadly. 
9. The use of the laws and theory to make predictions with respect to the 
problem. 
I find even fewer remarks in his paper that define directly Professor Rudner's 
use of "unity" in the phrase "the unity of the scientific method." Nor, given 
the context, are the dictionary definitions adequate. However, the matter need 
not detain us long. His meaning is quite clear, it seems to me. I take "unity" in 
that phrase to mean that the scientific method has but one character and can be 
applied to both social and physical phenomena. The steps listed in the paragraph 
above, say Professor Rudner and his friends, can be followed in social, as in 
physical, science inquiry. 
Assuming that I have defined Professor Rudner's terms correctly-or have 
come close enough-I accept the Rudner argument. To the extent that Professor 
Winch disagrees, may he burn in Hell forever. Certainly, "the scientific method" 
seems to provide a rigorous, systematic process for intellectual inquiry in the 
social sciences. I understand that the same can be said of the physical sciences. 
But sometimes the method is too rigorous. The material of the social sciences is 
too intractable for full application of the scientific method. Society is not 
always as cooperative as nature in S1'bmitting to the kind of tests required by the 
scientific method. However, that should not be construed as invalidating the 
Rudner thesis. The fact that the scientific method cannot always be applied 
fully does not mean that it should not be applied as fully as possible. In any case, 
I understand Professor Rudner to be arguing that it can be applied, not that it can 
be applied fully or that it shouid be used in all cases. My experience and ob­
servation lead me to agree that we in the social sciences need not leave that 
fertile territory exclusively to the physical sciences. The tool is too useful to go 
by default to only one branch of science. 
Value of the Rudner Thesis. To say that the Rudner thesis is right is not to 
say that it is worth stating. Before we social scientists buy the Rudner brand of. 
insecticide, we need to know, not only whether it works, but also whether it 
does the job that we need to have done. Are his views of value to us? Or was his 
earlier belief correct in holding that the unity of the scientific method is beyond 
dispute? In that case, further dispute is a waste of effort. Is Professor Winch a 
"curious anachronism"? U he is, he ill deserves the attention he gets from 
Professor Rudner. 
If the value of the Rudner position depended on its originality, it would fare 
poorly. Admittedly, he dismantles the Winch case with great skill and imagina­
tion. But when he is finished all he has left is a case that was won long ago and 
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many times over. Social scientists may dispute the practicality of using the 
scientific method in this. case or that, but its validity and utility when practical 
is not challenged seriously by working social scientists. 
Originality is not the only valid measure of value in such a discussion. Well­
stated reminders are valuable too. Though we know we have as much right as 
the physical sciences to the scientific method, we often forget it. The scientific 
method requires discipline and work. OfLen, it proves impractical. We get lazy, 
discouraged, inattentive. The method is used much less by social scientists than 
by physical scientists. �ofessor Rudner does well to remind us that this 
valuable tool is available to us, also. 
However, another point in Professor Rudner!s paper is much more valuable 
in current social science methodological debate. I refer to the support it brings 
to those social scientists who reject the argument that only the internal 
perspective is valid for the study of some social phenomena. "If you aren't part 
of the problem," says that argument, "you can't study it." Only Africans can 
study Africa, for instance. It takes one to know one. An especially colorful 
example of this approach might be an American woman anthropologist becom­
ing one of the eleven or so wives of a chieftain in the course of her study of the 
sexual behavior of his tribe, believing that she must become one with them­
literally-in order to study them. This seems to be the "teleology of the ob­
served" for which Professor Rudner berates Professor Winch. His attack on the 
Winchian view that "the only way in which . . .  a social science investigation can 
achieve understanding is via the adoption by the social scientist of the teleology 
of the observed" hits that approach squarely between the eyes. The internal­
perspective-monopoly view in the social sciences seems to have crested and to be 
retreating in the face of reality and commonsense. Still, the additional nail or 
two that Professor Rudner has driven into the coffin is well worth the effort. 
Value of the Winch Thesis. In order to decide rationally whether to buy the 
Rudner brand of insecticide, however, we must do more than merely consider 
its merits. Also, we must consider the alternative, the Winch brand. As a semi­
literate dirt farmer, I have not read the Winch book which Professor Rudner 
discusses, nor do I think it necessary for my purposes here. I am more interested 
in and concerned with the disagreement }>et ween Professor Rudner and Professor 
Rudner's interpretation of the Winch thesis than I am with lhe Winch thesis it­
self. In fact, even taking Winch on Rudner's terms, the value of the Winch 
alternative is quite apparent. 
In the first place, the Winchian emphasis on the "internal perspective" calls 
attention to an important, special asset of the social sciences. Although that 
perspective should not be construed as providing exclusive access to the truth, it 
�mains a valuable tool for the social scientist. An eloquent reminder of its 
availability is as useful as Professor Rudner's reminder that the scientific method 
is available to social scientists. To say that the French (or even French 
politicians) have no monopoly on the study of French politics is not to say that 
-insights derived from their perspective cannot be valuable to other students of 
French politics. Our opportunity to benefit from that perspective puts us at 
least one step ahead of the physical scientist. We should exploit that advantage 
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more. Take Professor Rudner's meteorologist, for instance. He can study 
tornadoes from books, charts, articles, radar readings, etc., or he can observe 
them visually from a distance if he has the good fortune to be nearby when one 
strikes, or, if his luck is really outstanding and he is picked up by a tornado and 
taken for a whirl, he can observe the object of his inquiry from within. 
Compare that meteorologist with our matrimonially-inclined anthropologist. 
Like the meteorologist, she can use appropriate literature in her study, she can 
observe from outside (peeping through the brush, I suppose), she can observe 
from within (residing in the village). But, also, she can go further. She can 
participate in the practice she is studying and she can interview native partici­
pants to elicit information on their activities and attitudes. Indeed, she can go 
still further by recruiting a member of the tribe into the anthropological pro­
fession, trained to study his own group. 
The physical sciences, unless one includes medicine, lack this opportunity to 
exploit the internal perspective. Not even Nils Bohr could contrive to go 
splitting with an atom in his smasher nor does Linus Pauling claim that he has 
ever interviewed a molecule. And, however much our lucky meteorologist 
might run around with tornadoes, he will never be able to hang American 
Meteorological Association memberships on them. Note that I reject the claim 
that the internal perspective is exclusively valid or necessarily superior, but I 
reject also, any suggestion that it is valueless or that it does not create special 
opportunities for social scientists. It gives social scientists access to a very 
valuable asset that is totally inaccessible to physical scientists. 
It seems to me that the "unity of the scientific method" argument implies 
that no significant differences exist between the use of that method in the two 
areas of science. I realize that this is not the direct thrust of Professor Rudner's 
thesis, but we are responsible for,our implications also. An Implication of his 
paper obscures a very important difference of which social scientists should be 
reminded at every opportunity. Without �uch reminding we lapse too easily into 
the role of library-bound scholars which should be anathema to most social 
scientists. Too many students of the British House of Commons, for instance, 
have never interviewed M.P.s. A classical example of that attitude was Woodrow 
Wilson's pioneering study, Congressional Gouemment, which he wrote a few 
miles from Washington without ever visiting Congress or talking to a Congress­
man. Such lapses are much less common now but still frequent enough lo re­
quire reminders, like Winch's, that unity is not necessarily identity and thal some 
of the differences can be exploited to the benefit of the social sciences. 
Obscuring the differences between the sciences with resped to the internal 
perspective creates another, more serious danger, it seems to me. Here, too, I 
see the "separatist'' argument as more valuable to the social sciences than the 
"unitarian" view. I refer to the danger of subjectivism to which the title of the 
Rudn�r paper alludes. In my opinion, subjectivism is the most · serious 
methodological problem affecting the social sciences today. We need all the help 
we can get to cope with it. I am disappointed that Professor Rudner did not see 
fit to exploit the opportunity offered by his title to tackle it instead of 
deflecting our gaze from it. He reassures us that Professor Winch's "flying lox 
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box" is harmless but never mentions the dangers from the plague of subjectivist 
locusts that has descended upon our crops from the very direction he had been 
posted to scout. 
The "unitarian" notion obscures the great differences between the physical 
and social sciences in the relationships of the investigator and the investigated. 
Because of those differences, the social scientist is under much greater psycho­
logical and social pressure and temptation to use the scientific method corruptly 
than is the physical scientist. Furthermore, most social phenomena worthy of 
scientific attention are more complex and much less easily susceptible of ex­
perimental control than are most phenomena of interest to physical scientists. 
This complexity makes lthe temptations and pressures very difficult to resist and 
the lapses from grace very difficult to discover and expose. It seems to me that 
the "unitarian" argument, however correct it may be technically, distracts 
attention from the problems arising from those differences and renders a grave 
disservice to those social scientists who are striving to work scientifically. 
The first of those critical differences is central to the objectivity-subjectivity 
debate of which, I understand, this symposium is intended to be a part. In the 
social sciences, Man studies Man, especially Man in his relations with other Men. 
In most of the physical sciences, Man studies Nature. The social scientist is, in 
effect, both investigator and investigated. Because of this identity, grave prob­
lems of objectivity arise'. The conflict of interest between the social scientist's 
two identities makes scientific detachment extremely difficult. He must detach 
himself from himself. 
Sometimes, this conflict of interest is direct and palpable. The patriotic 
American political scientist may be sorely tempted to present in the most 
favorable light his country's role in an international dispute. The economist­
educator may have to exercise restraint to avoid biased selection of indicators to 
show the economic value of education to best advantage. The Black sociologist 
may be under pressure to sacrifice scientific validity to the interests of racial 
equality. 
Sometimes, however, the conflict may be subtle and indirect. It may be 
highly personal and psychological. For instance, I am convinced that many 
specialists in one of my fields, comparative government, are attracted to that 
study because· they are dissatisfied with our own society and nourish a sub­
liminal hope that a search among other systems and institutions will confirm 
their implicit assumption that other countries have done better than we have. An 
anthropologist friend tells me that many of his colleagues have similar 
motivations. For one reason or another, they fit poorly into their own culture. 
They enter anthropology because they yearn subconsciously to find a more 
compatible culture as a way to prove that society, not themselves, is out of 
step. 
Conversely, some social scientists who identify themselves with specific 
groups or institutions tend to exalt them in their study. Like passengers in a 
hand-cranked elevator, they rise with the object they raise. A striking 
example of that phenomenon is recent study of the American Presidency. The 
reputation of that institution among students of American government has 
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depended far more on their personal experiences with it and their partisan biases 
than on scientific observation and theory. 
For a period of time around 1960, the Presidency was regarded with wildly­
exaggerated admiration. A consensus that formed among historians and political 
scientists portrayed the Presidency as the Great Repository of Virtue and Wis­
dom in our political system, the only institution with the vision, the impetus, 
and the ability to act in the national interest. However, they argued, the 
Presidency has too little power to put its virtue to best service for the country, 
especially in the areas of foreign and defense affairs. On the other hand, they saw 
Congress as a collection of bickering, selfish, litUe men out of step with the 
times and locked in an institution that was incapable of real action or leadership. 
They provided eloquent reasons and many examples to support their argument.1 
'l'en years later, another consensus-diametrically opposite to its predecessor­
dominated the social science view of the Presidency. Now, the office was seen 
as a "Frankenstein monster" spouting evil and spewing destruction. Virtue had 
become Vice; Wisdom had become Folly. Now, Presidential power was viewed 
as being grossly excessive, especially in the foreign and defense affairs areas 
where it had been seen as most insufficient a decade earlier. On the other hand, 
Congress has acquired shining armor and a halo. Now, the consensus holds that 
Congress is more "democratic" than the Presidency and that Presidents are "too 
isolated" from the people to exercise wise judgment. Only Congress, we hear 
now, can act in the national interest. The 1970 writers provide reasons for the 
new consensus that are equal in eloquence, but opposite in import to those of 
the 1960 consensus. 
This dramatic reversal of consensus seems to result from two factors. First, 
the 1960 writers preferred the policy positions of the Presidents to those of 
Congress during the preceding quprter-century. The 1970 writers, on the other 
hand, much preferred Congressional policies of the preceding half-decade to the 
Presidential positions-especially on Vietnam. In both cases, they elevated their 
policy preferences into constitutional theories. 
Secondly, most of the 1960 writers had had some substantial personal asso· 
ciation with the Roosevelt-Truman-Stevenson organizations in the executive 
branch of the national government. None had any significant connection with 
Congress. 'T'he 1970 writers either had had no affiliation with the Kennedy­
Johnson-Nixon Presidencies or had seen such affiliations tum sour. 
The record of one member of the 1960 group-the great constitutional law 
scholar, Edward S. Corwin-il ustrates the effect of career on theory. While 
Corwin was Woodrow Wilson's protege at Princeton and, later. while he support­
ed the New Deal actively and publicly and assisted Franklin Roosevelt in the 
"court packing" case, he was a "strong Presidency" theorist. When he broke 
with Roosevelt politically-apparently disappointed at being passed over for a 
Supreme Court seat-he turned against the strong Presidency also. After 
Roosevelt died and Corwin became a leader in the campaign against the proposed 
"Bricker amendment", he reversed his theoretical position on the question of 
Presidential power again. One cannot escape the harsh conclusion that the 
constitutional theory of one of the leading social scientists of his day followed 
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his personal career interests and political views. 
The extravagant claims of the Presidential Glorifiers of 1960 seemed very 
quaint by 1970. They had been fabricated of very perishable materials. Those 
materials were the circumstances of the time viewed from the writer's personal 
interests. They would not have been tempted to indulge that bias if the relation­
ship between investigator and the investigated had not produced the kind of 
conflict of interest that is typical of the social sciences but not of the physical 
sciences. In stressing the unity of scientific method, it seems to me, Professor 
Rudner overlooks this very grave methodological problem. 
That problem is compounded by the complexity that is typical of social 
science problems. Generally speaking, phenomena of interest to social scientists 
involve material more varied, uneven, and uncontrollable than is the case with 
most objects studied by physical scientists. This disorder renders the task of 
verification much more difficult i-n the social sciences than in the physical 
sciences, for predictions usually cannot be stated with the parsimony or tested 
with the precision of the physical sciences. They cannot be stated with compar­
able parsimony, for they must take so many factors into consideration. They 
cannot be tested with the same precision because the materials of the social 
scientist tend to be so much less susceptible to experimental control. The 
difficulties of verification and prediction create golden opportunities for in­
attentive social scientists to yield to the temptations, biases, and pressures that 
beset them on all sides and to corrupt Professor Rudnei"s "scientific method". 
No doubt, some analogous situations exist in the physical sciences, but they 
are not typical-as they are in the social sciences. If the difference between the 
two branches of science is one of degree, the degree is so great as to have the 
significance of kind. Once again, by stressing the similarities of the two branches, 
Professor Rudner distracts us from what should be our major concerns, whereas 
the Winch school calls attention to it. 
Conclusion. In reviewing the relative value of the Winch and Rudner 
contributions for the improvement of social science methodology, no clear 
balance can be struck. We need Professor Rudner prodding us to make fuller 
use of the scientific method and to regard scornfully claims that the internal 
perspective has some monopoly on truth. On the other hand, we need Professor 
Winch's reminder of the special '/alues of that perspective and of the dangers of 
subjectivism. The flying lox box may not, in fact, exist, but we are beset by 
plagues of other pests that exist abundantly. We have plenty of use for both 
brands of insectieide-and more besides. We need the Winches and the Rudners 
and, above all, we need the kind of stimulus provided by symposia like this to 
keep us aware of the many dangers surrounding us and to keep us from lapsing 
into methodological sloppiness from lack of sensitivity. 
FOOTNOTES 
1For a fuller treatment of this point. see my contribution to a book of readings on 
American government being edited by Professor Norma.n Thomas for J)ublication by 
Dodd, Mead in 1974. 
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